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PLAINTIFF'S ADVANTAGEOUS USE OF DISCOVERY,
PRE-TRIAL AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
By WILLIAM H. ERICKSON*
Counsel for the plaintiff has a veritable arsenal of discovery
weapons available to him, which he should employ early in every
case. Full use of the discovery procedure often results in summary
judgment on all or many issues, facilitates the most expeditious use
of a pre-trial conference, assists the trial judge in limiting the issues,
and simplifies the problems of the trial court.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938, provided
the first comprehensive discovery rules in the United States. After
the adoption of the Federal Rules, thirty-four states significantly
enlarged their discovery procedures.1 Now, nearly one-half of the
states have adopted rules which are identical to or closely patterned
after the Federal Rules and contain similar discovery rights.2
Therefore, today's plaintiff's counsel, except in state courts where
discovery rights are not governed by these discovery procedures,
is only concerned with the proper use of Rules 26 to 37 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. Where liberality in discovery does
not exist under state procedure, the plaintiff's counsel has good
reason to file his complaint in the federal court whenever possibleY
In Colorado, the plaintiff has even broader rights of discovery
in the state court than he does in the federal court, because he is
allowed to take the deposition of the adverse party at any time after
he commences the action by the service of summons or the filing of
a complaint. 4 Under the Colorado Rules, which are almost identical
to the Federal Rules, it is also possible to take the adverse party's
deposition before a complaint is filed and to tailor-make the com-
plaint to the adverse party's deposition, which often leads the plain-
tiff to an early summary judgment.5 The best use of discovery
depends, of course, upon the circumstances of each case, but in all
cases, wise use of the discovery rules will prevent the fox and
hound surprise tactics that were formerly a part of every trial.6
Partner in the Denver firm of Hindry, Erickson and Meyer.
1 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, §§ 9.1 - 9.53 (1961); Weinstein, Gleit &
Kay, Procedures for Obtaining Information Before Trial, 35 Texas L. Rev. 481 (1957).
2 Wicker, Tactical Advantages from the Use of Discovery, 27 Tenn. L. Rev. 323 (1959).
3 See Oil Tank Cleaning Corp. v. Reinauer Trans. Co., 149 F. Supp. 41 (D.N.Y. 1957), where the
court declared it to be common knowledge that federal discovery procedure was more liberal than
New York practice. In the State of Kansas, the plaintiff has limited deposition rights in the
state courts and can only invoke full discovery in the federal courts. Slough, Trial Preparation Under
the Kansas and Federal Rules: A Contract, 4 Kan. L. Rev, 58 (1955).
4 Colo. R. Civ. P. 3 Commencement of Action. (a) How Commenced. A civil ocion is commenced
(1) by filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by the service of a summons. The complaint must
be filed within 10 days after the summons is served, or the action may be dismissed without notice,
and in such case the court may, in its discretion, if it shall be of the opinion that the action was
vexatiously commenced, tax a reasonable attorney's fees as costs in favor of the defendant, to be
recovered by the plaintiff or his attorney. (b) Time of Jurisdiction. The court shall have jurisdiction
from the time of filing the complain or service of the summons.
5 Colo. R. Civ. P. 26 Depositions Pending Action. (a) When Depositions May Be Taken. After
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the
action the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken at the instance of any
party by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery
or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes. The attendance of witnesses may be
compelled by the use of subpoena as provided in rule 45. Depositions shall be taken only in
accordance with those rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only
by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.
6 Note, Developments n the Low - Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940 (1961).
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I. SCOPE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY-RULE 26 (b)
The breadth of discovery under Rules 26 to 37 is measured by
Rule 26 (b), which provides the following criteria:
*.. any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action .... including
the existence, 'description, nature, custody, condition and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of relevant facts. It is not ground for objection that the
testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence.
The interpretation of the breadth of discovery under Rule 26
(b) was before the Supreme Court of the United States in Hickman
v. Taylor.7 That classic case gave birth to the term "work product
of the lawyer," and declared the limits of discovery in the follow-
ing language:
[T] he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a
broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-hon-
ored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party
from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's
case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered
by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end,
either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever
facts he has in his possession, before the trial . . .thus re-
ducing the possibility of surprise. But discovery . . . has
ultimate and necessary boundaries. As indicated by Rules
30(b) and (d), limitations inevitably must be imposed
when it can be shown that the examination is being con-
ducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy,
embarrass or oppress the person subject to the inquiry.
And as Rule 26 (b) provides, . . .when the inquiry touches
upon the irrelevant, or encroaches upon the recognized
domains of privilege.
The pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism estab-
lished by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most significant inno-
vations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the
prior federal practice, the pre-trial functions of notice-
giving, issue-formulation and fact-revelation were per-
formed primarily and inadequately by pleadings. Inquiry
into the issues and facts before trial was narrowly con-
fined and was often cumbersome in method. The new rules,
however, restrict the pleadings of the task of general
notice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process
with a vital role in the preparation for trial. The various
instruments of discovery now serve (1) as a device, along
with the pre-trial hearings under Rule 16, to narrow and
clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a
device for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the
existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues.
Thus civil trials in the federal courts no longer need to be
7 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See Harv. L. Rev. 269 (1948).
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carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent
with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the full-
est possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.8
The full scope of the pronouncement in Hickman v. Taylor is
not easily determined. The issue before the court involved the im-
proper use of Rule 33 to secure the statements of witnesses which
the Supreme Court classified as the work product of the lawyer.
The Court held that statements of witnesses obtained by counsel
prior to the institution of an action were outside the proper scope
of examination and could not be obtained unless good cause was
shown. Technically, the decision established a guide to the dis-
cretion granted the trial court in denying discovery under Rule
30 (b). In determining whether a court will exercise that discretion
and grant discovery, two questions must be answered: First, are
the materials sought the type which the court endeavored to pro-
tect? If so, prima facie, discovery should be denied. Secondly, even
though the materials are of the crucial type and involve the work
product of the lawyer, is discovery necessary for an effective and
just disposition of the cause? If the answer is affirmative, the
moving party has shown good cause and should be entitled to ob-
tain discovery.9 Thus, even the lawyer's work product is not beyond
the limits of proper discovery.
Liberality of discovery is the keystone of justice. In Professor
Moore's summary of the benefits of the discovery procedure, the
plaintiff's counsel finds support for the broad use of rules of dis-
covery which will aid in the quest for truth and result in speedier
justice. Professor Moore said:
1. It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and
in checking and preventing perjury.
2. It is an effective means of detecting and exposing
false, fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses.
3. It makes available in a simple, convenient, and
often inexpensive way facts which otherwise could not
have been proved, except with great difficulty and some-
times not at all.
4. It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the
real value of their claims and defenses, thereby encouraging
settlements out of court.
5. It expedites the disposal of litigation, saves the time
8 Id. at 500-1, 507-8 (1947). See also Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064
(1959) where insurance policy limits were made available by discovery, when the court said,
"relevant to the subject matter" does not require that the evidence sought be admissible.
9 In Walsh v. Northern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 244 Wis. 281, 12 N.W.2d 20 (1943), it was held
that there was sufficient reason for discovery, when it was alleged that the person making the
statement was under sedatives at the time she was questioned, that she was questioned until
exhausted, and believed the statement contained inaccurate information. In Bearor v. Koppel,
24 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1940) discovery was allowed when plaintiff stated that he was ill when the
statement was taken, and that he was coerced with threats of being put in jail if he didn't sign
the statement. The court has also held that discovery was proper in Toftegoard v. Hart, 100
N.Y.S.2d 729 (1950), upon a showing that defendant's agent coerced the plaintiff into signing
the statement without an opportunity to read the statement, and plaintiff did not receive a copy of
the statement. On plaintiff's affidavit that he had grounds for believing the statement had been
fraudulently altered, the court allowed discovery in Nedimyer v. The Pennsylvania R.R., 6 F.R.D.
21 (1947). Again, in a suit against the United States for damages arising out of a military plane
crash it was held that the nature of the accident, the difficulty of obtaining information as to
the cause of the accident, the lapse of time and the fact that the witness was still in the military
service was good cause for allowing discovery. Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (1950).
Similarly, in Roach v. Boston Tow Boat Co., 19 F.R.D. 267 (1956), discovery was ordered when
the witnesses stated that their memories had been exhausted and that the statements would refresh
their recollection. See also note, Discovery: Work Product and Good Cause Development Since Hick-
man v. Taylor 36 Ind. L.J. 186 (1956).
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of the courts, and clears the docket of many cases by settle-
ments and dismissals which otherwise would have to be
tried.
6. It safeguards against' surprise at the trial, prevents
delays, and narrows and simplifies the issues to be tried,
thereby expediting the trial.
7. It facilitates both the preparation and the trial of
cases.' 0
In obtaining oral depositions and admissions of fact, and in sub-
mitting interrogatories to the adverse party, plaintiff's counsel must
await the passage of the statutory period of time before seeking
discovery. When the time limitations on the plaintiff's right to dis-
covery expire, the discovery rules are self-executing and do not
require action by the court. An over-zealous plaintiff may find that
his premature attempt to obtain discovery is thwarted by a motion
for a protective order under Rule 30 (b) or a motion to terminate
or limit examination under Rule 30(d). Abuse of discovery rights
afforded to a plaintiff will find the court listening sympathetically
to the defendant's motion." Judge Kauffman has suggested that the
appreciation of the judicial sanctions which may be carried out
under the authority of Rule 37, if discovery is denied, cause the
attorneys for both sides to cooperate.
12
10 4 Moore, Federal Practice 1014-I016 (2d ed. 1962). See also Estes, Discovery and Motions
Practice, 29 F.R.D. 280 (1962).
11 Plaintiff's Discovery Timetable Under the Federal Rules
Depositions on oral interrogatories (Rule 30).
When: At any time after commencement of action. If within first 20
days, leave of court must be obtained.
From whom: Any person, party or witness.
Notice: Reasonable notice must be given all parties, and notice must
be given whether deponent is party or witness. Reasonable
notice is not less than 5 days. Moore, 30.03.
Subpoena: Required for witnesses; not required for parties.
Objections and orders for
protection of parties: To be made promptly.
Motion to compel answers: To be heard by court on reasonable notice.
Depositions on written interrogatories (Rule 31).
Substantially the same as depositions on oral interrogatories.
Cross-interrogatories: Within 10 days after service of direct.
Redirect interrogatories: Within 5 days after service of cross.
Recross interrogatories: Within 3 days after service of redirect.
Interrogatories to the parties (Rule 33).
When: At any time after commencement of action. If within first 10
days, leave of court must be obtained.
From whom: Parties only.
Time to obiect: Within 10 days after service.
Time to answer: Within 15 days after service.
Motion to compel answers: To be heard by court on reasonable notice.
Inspection and copying of documents and things (Rule 34).
When: At any time after commencement of action. Motion must be
heard on reasonable notice and good cause must be shown for
production of documents.
From whom: Parties only.
Physical and mental examinations (Rule 35).
When: At any time after commencement of action. Motion must be
heard on reasonable notice and good cause shown for the
physical examination.
From whom: Parties only.
Requests for admissions (Rule 36).
When: At any time after commencement of action. If within first 10
days, leave of court must be obtained.
Time to object, admit or deny: Must answer or object within period set forth in notice, which
cannot be less than 10 days.
12 Kaufman, Judicial Control of Discovery, 28 F.R.D 37, 111 (1961). But see, Speck, The Use of
Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 Yale L.J. 1132 (1951).
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II. DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION-RULE 30 (a)
The oral deposition is the plaintiff's sledge hammer in every
case. Under Rule 30(a), a party may examine any person on oral
deposition without leave of court, except that Rule 26(a) requires
the plaintiff to obtain leave if his notice of the taking is served
within twenty days after the commencement of the action. Before
the examination, Rule 30 (b) provides that any party or the person
to be examined may apply to the court for a protective order to
prevent the taking of the deposition or to limit the scope of the
examination or otherwise avoid "annoyance, embarrassment, or
oppression." During the taking of the deposition, if a party or de-
ponent objects to any question, his objection is recorded in the
testimony taken, subject to the objection. However, the party or
deponent may demand, under Rule 30(d), that the taking of the
deposition be suspended for such time as may be necessary to
allow him to apply to the court for an order terminating the exam-
ination or limiting its scope. An order obtained under Rule 30 (d)
is only granted when it can be shown that the examination is being
conducted in bad faith or in such a way that it will "unreasonably
annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party .... "In prac-
tice, the courts have seldom found that the questions propounded
in the taking of a deposition would not lead to the discovery of
MENEM ~ ~~.~ . ....
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admissible evidence and have held that objectionable inquiries
could be dealt with at time of trial.
13
All lawyers agree that the deposition should be taken in a
manner which will obtain the greatest amount of information for
use at the time of trial, as well as for use in connection with a
motion for summary judgment or request for admission or as a
wedge to force a limitation of issues at the pre-trial conference.
From the plaintiff's standpoint, he desires to take the first deposi-
tion. If he is able to question an opposing party or hostile witness
before his own client is examined, he can then study the defendant's
version of the facts and better prepare his client for his all-impor-
tant deposition.1
4
Priority of discovery represents a substantial tactical advantage,
not only for a party who will deliberately change his story, but also
for an honest party. Priority of notice has been the basis for de-
terminating priority of discovery in many cases. 15 The rule of pri-
ority was formulated to protect the defendant until he could get a
lawyer, but in practice it furnishes the defendant with a head start
in the discovery race. Thus, while the plaintiff is hamstrung by the
twenty-day time limitation of Rule 26 (a), he may be served with
either interrogatories, requests for admissions, or a notice to take
deposition, which will prevent him from exercising any right of
discovery until the defendant has fully explored his case.1 6 The rule
is fundamentally unfair, because the plaintiff has the burden of
proof and must be prepared to sustain his complaint against the
defendant's motions and at the time of trial.
The rule of priority has had various inroads made upon it by
judicial determination that the party having the right of priority has
lost his right by undue delay or bad faith.'7 The courts have also
been sympathetic in ordering that depositions be taken simultane-
ously or alternately.'8
Most lawyers find that opposing counsel will cooperate and
stipulate, in writing, as required by Rule 29, that a deposition may
be taken at a certain time and place before a particular court re-
porter or notary public. In the event counsel will not agree, the
13 See United States v. Cotton Valley Comm., 75 F. Supp. 1 (1948); Grinnell Co., Inc. v.
National Bank of Far Rockaway, 1 F.R.D. 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); DeSeversky v. Republic Aviation Corp.,
2 F.R.D. 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1940); Mackerer v. New York Cent. R.R., 1 F.R.D. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1940). See
also Discovery Procedure Extended, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 553 (1957); Van Cise, Depositions and
Discovery, Rules 26 to 37, 28 Dicta 375 (1951); Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions Under Federal
Rules, 59 Yale L.J. 117, 138 (1949).
14 Fowler, Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 Tenn. L. Rev. 475 (1959).
15 See, e.g., Reading-Sinram-Streat Coals, Inc. v. Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 21 F.R.D. 333
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); 4 Moore, Federal Practice § 26.13 2d ed. 1962. The priority principle is not limited
to depositions but applies to other discovery devices as well, in so far as it protects the party
having deposition priority from his opponent's attempts to invoke any device while the depositions
are being taken. See cases cited note 16-18 supro. However, the party first serving interroga-
tories (which the plaintiff may do without leave of court after only ten days) does not thereby
acquire priority for the purpose of taking depositions. Dow Chem. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 26
F.R.D. 179 (D.Del. 1960).
16 See, e.g., Shulman, Inc. v. Shertz, 18 F.R.D. 94 (E.D.Pa. 1955). But cf. Kurtt M. Jachmann
Co. v. Marine Office of America, 16 F.R.D. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). See Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co.,
19 F.R.D. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); B & B Theatres Corp. v. Atlanta Enterprises, Inc., 22 Fed. R. Serv. 306.33
(N.D.Ga. 1956). See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 25 F.R.D. 237
(D.Del. 1959); Technical Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 18 F.R.D. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
(production of documents).
17 Kurt M. Jachmann Co. v. Hartley, Cooper & Co., 17 F.R.D. 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Carribean
Constr. Corp. v. Kennedy Van Saun Mfg. & Eng'r. Coro., 13 F.R.D. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
18Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Pub. Co., 11 F.R.D. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See Arm-
strong v. Doyle, 20 Misc.2d 1087, 193 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1959). In Huber Baking Co. v. Frank C.
Sparks Co., 45 Del.-525, 76 A.2d 125 (Super. Ct. 1950), aff'd on reh., 46 Del. 153, 81 A.2d 132
Super. Ct. 1951), a party was compelled by court order to allow one of his witnesses to be
examined out of the presence of other witnesses.
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simple notice provided by Rule 30(a) may be utilized, and the
notice may even be supplemented by a request for the production
of documents, which may serve as a subpoena duces tecum, in the
event the adverse party does not find reason to seek the protective
provisions of Rule 30 (b).11 To be certain that all documents will be
available for examination during the time that the deposition is
taken, the plaintiff should supplement his notice to take deposition
with a subpoena duces tecum to require the production of docu-
ments under Rule 45 (d) ,20 which may be obtained without a show-
ing of good cause by merely moving ex parte for an order for the
issuance of the subpoena.
In taking the deposition of the adverse party, the plaintiff
should consider the use which he intends to make of the deposition.
If the deposition is to be used for impeachment purposes only, the
foundation required by Rule 26 (d) for use as evidence at the time
of trial need not be laid. However, if any question exists as to the
availability of the witness or the party at the time of trial because
of age, sickness, or infirmity, or because of his transient nature, the
better practice is to lay the foundation which would enable the
examining party to offer the deposition as evidence at the time of
trial.
21
The advantages lying behind the proper use of the deposition
technique are many. Through the deposition, the plaintiff may
ascertain whether he has properly joined and named all of the de-
fendants. He may obtain admissions which will serve as a substitute
for other proof. He may inquire about the identification and de-
scription of all relevant documents, so that he may particularize his
designation of documents when he moves for the production of
documents under Rule 34. He can tie down, or freeze, his opponent's
version of the facts and examine his opponent as a witness. A prop-
erly taken deposition will perpetuate testimony that may be used
as evidence under Rule 26(d). A well taken deposition will help
locate all probable witnesses and expose contentions of the defend-
ant that have not been the subject of prior investigation. When a
deposition has been taken, the issues are clarified and narrowed and
the plaintiff is in a position to fully appraise his case for either
settlement or trial.22 Of course, the key use of depositions is for
cross-examination and impeachment, and once the deposition is
taken, surprise is eliminated at the time of trial.23
III. DEPOSITIONS OF WITNESSES UPON WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES-
RULE 31
In planning discovery, the plaintiff will seldom have occasion
to use Rule 31, which is cumbersome and difficult to use because all
19 4 Moore, Federal Practice, § 26.10 (2d ed. 1962); Shenker v. United States, 25 F.R.D. 96
(1960), reviews the background of a notice to produce which is served as part of the notice to take
deposition. Originally, the notice was honored because a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 45(d)
was an empty formality. Rule 37(d) imposes no sanctions for a failure to comply with the notice;
Smith v. Bentley, 9 F.R.D. 489 (1949).
20 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1005 (1961); Moore, Federal Practice
34.02-45.05 (2d ed. 1962), points out that Rules 34 and 45 must be read together and that Rule
34 should control production of documents by a party before trial. See Jack Loeks Enterprises, Inc.
v. W. S. Butterfield Theatres, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 303 (D.Mich. 1957); Hickey v. United States, 18
F.R.D. 88 (D.Pa. 1952).
21 Winner, The Discovery Procedure in General Practice, 12 Wya. L. J. 231 (1957).
22 Insurance companies carefully examine depositions before making settlement. Low, How to
Prepare and Try a Negligence Case 69 (1957).
23 Erickson, Depositions Limited or Unlimited, ABA Sect. Ins. N & CL, 333, 337 (1957).
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interrogatories have to be served in advance and before the inter-
rogatories are propounded to the witness by the reporter. With
such a limitation, counsel must anticipate what the answers will
be to the direct, cross, redirect, and recross interrogatories which
are provided for in the rule. The crystal ball requirements of Rule
31 limit the use to the occasion when a witness is a great distance
from the court and the cost of taking an oral deposition is not justi-
fied by the particular case. As an added disadvantage, counsel may
not with propriety review the answers to the interrogatories with
the deponent, even if the deponent happens to be a party or a
friendly witness.2 4 However, a saving feature is contained in Rule
31 (d). On motion, by a party or the deponent, prior to examination,
the court may order, if good cause is shown, that the deposition be
taken upon oral examination.
IV. INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES-RULE 33
An adverse party may also be examined under Rule 33 through
interrogatories submitted directly to him for answer under oath,
commonly with the direct assistance of counsel. If the party being
interrogated objects to any question, he may apply to the court for
appropriate relief when he can show good cause for the entry of a
protective order under Rule 30(b). The number of interrogatories
allowed the plaintiff under Rule 33 is not expressly limited, and
each case must be examined to determine whether the plaintiff has
acted reasonably under the circumstances in propounding inter-
rogatories.
The rule applies only to adverse parties, and most courts have
held that adverseness must appear from the pleadings. Unless a
claim has been made by one party against the other, adversity is
lacking.
2 5
Rule 33 has its greatest force when a corporate defendant is
involved. An interrogatory propounded under Rule 33 will require
the corporate defendant to ferret out any facts, regardless of their
location, and supply the information requested in the interroga-
tory.26 The defendant must supply the plaintiff with clerical work
when questions are asked that require the compiling of statistics,
accounts, or figures that are located in different reports, offices, and
files.27 Moreover, the interrogatories to a corporate defendant may
be introduced in evidence at the time of trial under Rule 26 (d).
Answers to interrogatories are often resourcefully prepared by
defense counsel to be noninformative to the questions propounded, 2
but Rule 33 carries with it a "continuing duty" for the defendant
to assure the truth of the answers to interrogatories propounded
up to the time of trial. Typically, the question giving rise to the
duty to respond presents itself in a personal injury case when the
plaintiff or defendant serves an interrogatory asking for the names
244 Moore, Federal Practice 31.02, at 2153 (2d ed. 1962). Homdi & Ibrahim Mango Co. v.
Fire Ass'n., 20 F.R.D. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
25 See Kestner v. Reading Co., 21 F.R.D. 303 (E.D.Pa. 1957); M.V.M., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 20 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Harlan Produce Co. v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 8 F.R.D. 104
(W.D.N.Y. 1948); 71 Harv. L. Rev. 734 (1958).
26 Robbins v. Brockton St. Ry., 180 Mass. 51, 61 N.E. 265 (1901).
27 See Fowler, Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 Tenn. L. Rev. 475, 481
(1959).
28 See Fowler & Sokolow, Discovery Proceedings Under the Federal Rules, 3 Prac. Law Institute
Monograph (1955).
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and addresses of witnesses to the accident and thereafter the inter-
rogated party, having surrendered all the names he had at the time,
subsequently discovers another witness. At the time of trial the
testimony of the surprise witness will provoke objections of bad
faith and unfair surprise. The courts, in examining similar circum-
stances, have held that the defendant has a continuing duty out of
common fairness to inform the plaintiff of the newly discovered
witness.
29
The limited cost of interrogatories and right to follow interroga-
tories with an oral deposition make the use of Rule 33 all but a
mandatory requirement for plaintiff's counsel in every case.
V. DISCOVERY AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS FOR
INSPECTION, COPYING, OR PHOTOGRAPHING--RULE 34
Under Rule 34, a party may for good cause move that the court
direct any other party to produce documents or tangible things for
inspection before trial. Similarly, a party may obtain permission
of the court to enter upon land or other property of another party
in order to inspect or photograph the premises or "any object or
operation .... " Rule 34 incorporates the general discovery scope
of Rule 26 (b) and contains four general requirements which must
be met by plaintiff's counsel as a condition precedent to the pro-
duction of any given document:
1. "Good cause" must be shown for the production of a
document.
2. It must be "relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action."
3. It may not be "privileged."
4. It must be in the "possession, custody, or control" of the
person or party from whom the document is sought to be
produced.
The rule is limited to parties and cannot be used to obtain docu-
ments in the possession of a witness.
The plaintiff has the obvious limitation in using Rule 34 that
he does not have in using Rule 45 (d) when he seeks the production
of documents in taking a deposition of an adverse party because
the plaintiff, in utilizing Rule 34, has the burden of showing good
29 McNally v. Yellow Cab Co., 16 F.R.D. 460 (E.D.Pa. 1954); White Tower Management Corp.
v. Erie Main Corp., 28 N.J. Super. 425, 100 A.2d 775 (1953); See also, Grauman, Deposition and
Discovery, 47 Ky. L.J. 175 (1959).
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cause, and the burden is reversed when the adverse party seeks a
protective order to avoid producing documents which have been
subpoenaed for a deposition under Rule 45 (d) .0
Thus, document discovery differs significantly from discovery
through depositions, interrogatories, and admissions by placing on
the parties seeking disclosure the onus of going to court in the first
instance and establishing a right to the information. Necessarily,
much must be left to the discretion of the trial court in determin-
ing what constitutes good cause in the circumstances of a particu-
lar case.' It has been held that Rule 34 should be liberally con-
strued 2'-2 However, shot gun requests for the production of docu-
ments will not be honored, and it is better practice for the plaintiff
to determine the documents which he requires with specificity by
the use of either interrogatories or depositions.13 Great controversy
has arisen around attempts to obtain: (1) the reports of experts,
(2) the written statements of the plaintiff which were obtained by
a claims adjuster, (3) the defendant's income tax returns, and (4)
his insurance liability policy. 4 The mere allegation that the docu-
ments sought are material and relevant will not sustain the plain-
tiff's burden in seeking an order under Rule 34.35
The ease of discovery by deposition or interrogatory causes the
plaintiff to avoid the. necessity of going forward with proof of good
cause for the production of documents until he has exhausted his
other remedies. Usually, counsel for the defendant will stipulate as
to the production or examination of most documents and things and
will only require Rule 34 to be used when the instruments or docu-
ments sought are indeed necessary to the proof of the plaintiff's
case. In such a case, Rule 34 becomes a necessary and useful tool to
prepare for trial.
VI. PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION-RULE 35
Whenever the physical or mental condition of a party is in
controversy, the court may, upon a showing of good cause, direct
that party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a
physician under Rule 35. A violent controversy existed as to the
dangers and the inherent unconstitutionality of the rule when it
was adopted, but it has been upheld"6 and has not been abused in
practice.
The rule casts the burden of showing good cause upon the
party seeking the examination, but in practice a physical exam-
ination is agreed to without a hearing. When a physical examina-
tion is granted, Rule 35 (b) grants unto the party examined the right
to request and receive a "written report of the examining physician
setting out his findings and conclusions."
Rule 35 (b) seems to be weighed in favor of the plaintiff at first
blush, but if the plaintiff requests a copy of the report of the physi-
30 Moore, Federal Practice, 26.10 (2d ed. 1962), suggests that the in pari material construction
of the Rules closes the door to the use of Rule 45(d) unless good cause is shown. See United
States v. 6.82 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 195 (D.N.M. 1955).
31 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 796 (1961).
32 Lindsay v. Prince, 8 F.R.D. 233 (N.D.Ohio 1948).
33 United States v. American Optical Co., 2 F.R.D. 534 (S.DN.Y. 1942); See also, Ronan, Desig-
nation of Documents Under Rule 34, 25 Ins.L.J. 313 (1958); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 1135 (1949).
34 See Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 796-798 (1961).
35 Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. E. F. Drew & Co., 13 F.R.D. 127 (D.C.Del. 1952).
36 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
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cal examination conducted by the defendant's physician, he thereby
unequivocally makes all medical reports which he has acquired
from his own physician, or which he may obtain in the future,
available for examination by the defendant. Thus, Rule 35 (b) is a
two-edged sword, and the plaintiff may find that the court excludes
the testimony of the physicians who have prepared his own medical
reports if he fails to make the reports available to the defendant.
37
Moreover, Rule 35 (b) (2) provides that the plaintiff also waives any
privilege which he might have if he either requests a copy of the
examination ordered under Rule 35 or takes the deposition of the
examiner.
Often a controversy arises as to the manner in which the exam-
ination will be conducted, and many plaintiffs take the position that
they will not be examined outside of the presence of their counsel.
Needless to say, the doctors do not favor the presence of counsel
during the examination, and the question of the plaintiff's right to
insist upon his lawyer's presence during the examination has re-
sulted in divergent views. The leading federal case is Dziwanoski
v. Ocean Carriers Corp.38 in which the defendants were sustained in
their contention that the presence of the plaintiff's attorney during
the examination would interfere and hinder the physician in con-
ducting his examination. The court, in the Dziwanoski case, held
that no useful purpose would be served by the presence of counsel,
and that proper objection could be made at the time of trial if the
physician improperly inquired into facts on which legal rights were
based. The decision rested on the impartiality of examining doctors
and recognized that the plaintiff could, in a proper case, have his
own doctor present during the examination if he felt it necessary.
Many decisions are contrary to the Dziwanoski case and recognize
the right of the plaintiff to have his lawyer present during the ex-
amination to afford protection against improper questions which
might be propounded by the examining physician as to the history
of the accident or other legal matters.39 However, the plaintiff
should consider whether he loses more than he gains by having
counsel present. Obviously, the presence of counsel may tend to
create hostility in the examining doctor, and result in an unfiair
appraisal of the plaintiff's physical condition. Moreover, it must be
conceded that plaintiff's counsel can protect the plaintiff against a
physician's questions which delve into the history of the accident
by writing out a brief description of the occurrence complained of
so that the examining doctor may fairly determine whether a casual
condition exists between the injury and the conduct of the de-
fendant.
A physical examination assists a plaintiff in a personal injury
action because it enables the defendant's lawyer and the defendant's
insurance carrier to fully appraise the injuries which the plaintiff
has suffered and to determine what would be a proper settlement
value. Most defense lawyers will not settle a serious personal injury
37 See, Barnet, Compulsory Medical Examinations Under the Federal Rules, 41 Va. L. Rev. 1059
(1955).
38 26 F.R.D. 595 (D.Md. 1960).
39 Sharff v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 44 Col.2d 508, 282 P.2d
896 (1955); Francisco v. Hoffman, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 420, 131 N.E.2d 692 (1955); Kelley v. Smith
Oby Co.. 70 Ohio L. Abs. 202, 129 N.E.2d 106 (1954); Williams v. Chattanooga Iron Works, 131
Tenn. 683, 176 S.W. 1031 (1915); see Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 822.2
(1961).
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action until an up to date medical report has been obtained on the
plaintiff's condition. Therefore, even though Rule 35 directs that a
physical examination may be permitted, counsel for the plaintiff
generally cooperate and allow defense counsel to have such physical
examinations conducted as may be necessary in the light of each
particular case.
VII. ADMISSION OF FACTS AND OF GENUINENESS OF
DOCUMENTS-RULE 36
To further buttress the plaintiff's case, requests for admissions
may be served which must be answered within the ten-day limita-
tion of the rule, with a "sworn statement denying specifically the
matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail
the reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters."
Unless the defendant admits or denies the request made, the facts
set forth in the request are "deemed admitted."
The Rule 36 procedure for "admission of facts and of genuine-
ness of documents" is not, strictly speaking, a discovery device. 40
The rule assumes that a litigant already knows certain facts which
enable him to avoid the necessity of proof by obtaining admissions
from his adversary.
4'
The limited use of the rule is in part due to the weakness of its
sanction. 42 Rule 37 imposes strong sanctions for failure to comply
with the other discovery rules, but the only penalty for unreason-
able denials of an admission requested under Rule 36 is an order
to pay the cost incurred in making the proof. Substantial sums have
been assessed under Rule 37 (c), but the sanction deters only fla-
grant denials. 43 Although the risk involved in Rule 36 denials is
light, the consequence of failing to make any response to a request
for admission may be severe because the matter in question is then
deemed to be admitted under Rule 36 (a).44 Moreover, the defendant
cannot obtain ex parte extensions of time to answer a request for
admissions and can only gain an enlargement of time by motion and
notice to the adverse party. Objections can be made, but notice must
be served with the objections; even then the basis for objections is
clearly set out in the rule and is limited to privilege, relevance, and
the form of the request. The defendant may answer, fail to answer,
or may answer the request without complying with the oath re-
quirement of Rule 36 (a) and thereby open the door to summary
judgment by the admissions thus obtained.
A controversy also reigns as to the effect of Rule 36 admissions
in "estopping the answering party to take a different position at the
trial. '45 Parties have been relieved from improvident admissions
by showing good cause in advance of trial, but the relief has only
40 United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 203 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); Conway, Admissions of Fact Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 J.B.A.D.C. 421,
422 (1959).
41 Knowlton v. Atchison, T. & S.F.Ry., 11 F.R.D. 62 (D.Mo. 1951).
42 Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 Mich. L.
Rev. 205, 222 (1942).
43 Akins v. McKnight, 13 F.R.D. 9 (N.D.Ohio 1952) (assessment of $3500 against the guilty party).
44 E.g., Chicago, R.I. & Pac.R.R. v. Williams, 245 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 1957).
45 Arkansas Tenn. Distributing Corp. v. Breidt, 209 F.2d 359 (3rd Cir. 1954); McGee v. Heim, 362
P.2d 193 (Colo. 1962), allowed a party to offer evidence contradicting an admission which resulted
from his failure to answer a request for admisison under Rule 36.
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been given in unusual cases. 46 It seems clear that admissions under
the rule must ordinarily have a binding effect, since otherwise the
purpose of the ruling in excluding issues from the trial would be
frustrated.
4 7
Because the plaintiff may anticipate that the defendant will
seek to introduce evidence in opposition to any crucial fact which
has been admitted, he must be prepared to produce testimony to
prove the admitted fact. However, with admissions in hand, he is
able to force the defendant at the pre-trial conference to limit the
issues in accordance with the Rule 36 admissions and can thereby
avoid the expense of proof at the time of trial.
46 United States v. Wimbley, 125 F.Supp. 691 (W.D. Ark. 1954); Barron & Holtzoff, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 838 (1961).
47 United States v. Lemons, 125 F.Supp. 686, 689 (W.D. Ark. 1954); International Carbonic
Engineering Co. v. Natural Carbonic Products, Inc., 57 F.Supp. 248 (S.D. Cal. 1944), aff'd 158
F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1946).
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VIII. REFUSAL TO MAKE DISCOVERY - CONSEQUENCES - RULE 37
Rule 37 appears at the end of the discovery section of the rules
and deals exclusively with sanctions to enforce compliance with
discovery which are broad enough to cover every contingency. 4
If a party, after receiving notice of the taking of his deposition
or after being served with interrogatories, willfully fails to appear
or to serve answers, the court may, under Rule 37(d), strike his
pleadings, dismiss the action, or enter a default judgment. The sev-
erity of these sanctions is essential under the liberal pleading rules
and especially since the "willful" requirement necessitates a deter-
mination that the default was not excusable.
49
On the other hand, if a party or any witness appears for deposi-
tion or serves answers to interrogatories but refuses to answer some
of the questions put to him, the rules are much less stringent, and
the court may, if an order is sought to compel answers, order the
recalcitrant party to pay reasonable expenses and attorney's fees.50
If the court enters an order compelling response to any discovery
request and the order is disobeyed, another group of sanctions be-
comes available. The court may, under Rule 37 (b), make such or-
ders "as are just," including the following enumerated sanctions:
1. Hold in contempt;
2. Take designated facts to be established in accordance
with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
3. Prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or oppos-
ing said claims or defenses or introducing certain evi-
dence;
4. Strike pleadings or parts thereof;
5. Stay proceedings until the order is obeyed;
6. Dismiss or enter a default judgment;
7. Arrest.
IX. SUMMARY JUDGMENT - RULE 56
Rule 56 (c) fixes the standard which the plaintiff must satisfy
if he is to obtain a summary judgment. It provides that the "judg-
ment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."51
The summary judgment procedure is historically a plaintiff's reme-
dy, and Rule 56 was designed to prevent delay and afford judgment
where no defense existed and where the defense asserted to the
plaintiff's claim was merely a sham.52 The motion depends upon the
facts pleaded and the proof available to sustain the claim, and a
summary judgment may be granted when the movant would not
be entitled to a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 13 (c) or a
dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted," under Rule 12 (b) (6). The summary judgment rule was
48 Societe Int'l v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
49 Christenson, The Pre-Trial Order, 29 F.R.D. 362, 376 (1962); Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate
Pre-Trial Discovery, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 480 (1958).
50 Unilectric, Inc. v. Holwin Corp., 243 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1956).
51 Porter v. Jones, 176 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1949).
52 3-A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1231 (1961); Clark and Samenow,
The Summary Judgement, 38 Yale L.J. 423 (1929).
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designed to enable the parties to utilize the discovery procedures
to ascertain facts and formulate issues which could be properly
disposed of as a matter of law by summary judgment without trial
on the merits.
53
A motion for summary judgment may or may not be accom-
panied by affidavits. If affidavits are offered in support of the judg-
ment, they must comply with the requirements of Rule 56 (e) and
must be based on personal knowledge rather than information and
belief. Sworn or certified copies of all papers, or parts thereof, re-
ferred to in an affidavit must be attached to the affidavit and served
with the affidavit.54 Moreover, the plaintiff must recognize that the
affidavits are measured by the rules of evidence, and not the rules
of discovery. 55 Rule 56 does not contemplate "trial by affidavit." If
the affidavits are in proper form, and there are before the court
affidavits which controvert each other as to material facts, then
the case is obviously not one for summary judgment, and a trial
will be ordered.
5 6
In addition to the affidavits, the court will take into considera-
tion the admissions which appear of record, either from pleadings
or from requests made pursuant to Rule 36, together with the de-
positions and interrogatories which are on file with the court.57
Once discovery is completed and the pleadings have been analyzed,
the sham defense stands out where it can be readily challenged.
The cloak of a formal allegation denying liability will not be found
to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material
fact, and summary judgment will enter if the resisting party elects
to rest on his pleadings.,5
Rule 56(d) also causes the court to ascertain, in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the facts which are not in substan-
tial controversy, and thereby grants the plaintiff an opportunity
to limit the issues for pre-trial or trial. Thus, Rule 56, when coupled
with the discovery rules, grants the plaintiff an opportunity for
early judgment in a proper case.
X. PRE-TRIAL - RULE 16
The pre-trial hearing is the "warp and woof" of discovery. 59
... It permits the total discovery picture to be discussed
at one time. It facilitates the issuance of a broad order reg-
ulating the future course of discovery, as well as settling
specific discovery problems which are pending ....
Pre-trial must be tailored to the individual case. Some
cases will demand a very complete initial pre-trial confer-
ence and a series of subsequent conferences to deal with
other emerging difficulties. Some cases will be sufficiently
controlled by a complete initial pre-trial order that, ar-
ranges with particularity the details of future discovery. No
generalizations as to the form of pre-trial procedures should
53 Weller, Summary Judgement, 12 Wyo. L.J. 247 (1957-58).
54 Walling v. Fairmount Creamery, 139 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1943).
55 Jomeson v. Jameson, 176 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
56 Lemley, Summary Judgment Procedure Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Its Use and Abuse, 11 Ark. L. Rev. 138 (1957).
57 Pike & Willis, New Federal Deposition - Discovery Procedure, 38 Colum. L. Rev. 1436 (1938).58 Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943); United States v. Dollar, 100 F.Supp.
881 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Hays, The Use of Summary Judgment, 28 F.R.D. 126 (1960).
59 Kaufman, Judicial Control of Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 111, 124 (1961).
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be made lest formalism and rigidity develop to rob the pre-
trial conference of its greatest asset - flexibility.
The federal rules are designed to find the truth and to
prepare for the disposition of the case in favor of the party
who is justly deserving of a judgment. To limit discovery
arbitrarily because of some preconceived notion as to time
or scope is merely to transfer uncertainties and ambiguities
to the trial itself. The trial process is not designed to deal
adequately with a mass of undigested and undifferentiated
data. There is nothing more dispiriting than a trial wherein
the attorneys are not only not clear as to the opponents'
positions, but are really quite confused as to their own
cases. Documents are offered, witnesses testify, details pile
up, and, from a welter of confusion, justice is supposed
somehow to ensue. A little time and effort spent before trial
can often eliminate a shocking waste of far more expensive
trial time. This is to the advantage of both sides, and im-
proves the administration of justice. 0
Besides controlling discovery, the pre-trial conference often
functions as a discovery device itself, facilitating and even sup-
planting the operation of particular disclosure procedures. For ex-
ample, stipulations reached at the conference and embodied in the
pre-trial order may have essentially the same effect as Rule 36 ad-
missions in excluding issues from consideration at the trial. The
pursuit of such stipulations has been formalized in some courts by
requiring the parties to prepare for use at the conference written
statements of their positions in the case. By comparing the opposing
statements, the judge can see which factual questions are not truly
relevant or disputed and often can induce the parties to stipulate
them out of the case. While admissions sought in these circum-
stances do not carry the cost-of-proof sanction of Rule 37 (c), the
presence of opposing counsel and the judge may often prove a more
effective stimulant. The use of such stipulations at the pre-trial may
help to explain the relative neglect of Rule 36.
Another discovery procedure sometimes supplanted by the pre-
trial conference is the production of documents under Rule 34 or 45.
Many federal courts require that each party produce at the confer-
ence for inspection by his adversary all the documents, except those
to be used for impeachment, which he intends to introduce at the
trial. The penalty for noncompliance is exclusion of the withheld
document from evidence, except when its existence or relevance
does not become known until after the conference. This procedure
for production of the documents a party intends to introduce does
not completely replace Rule 34, since it is often the documents a liti-
gant wants to conceal which most interest his opponent. However,
for at least some of the necessary documents it obviates the incon-
venience of Rule 34's requirement of a formal motion, a showing
of good cause, and reasonable specificity of designation.
The conference may also be effective in complementing pre-
viously instituted discovery processes. When Rule 33 interrogatories
60 See also, Seminar on Procedure for Effective Judicial Administration, 29 F.R.D. 201-314 (1962);
Seminar on Practice and Procedure uncer the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 F.R.D. 37-301
(1961); Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960).
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have already been served and answered or documents produced for
inspection, counsel may be prepared at the conference to stipulate
the truth of his opponent's answers or the authenticity of the docu-
ments he has produced. Further, the problem of a party's "con-
tinuing duty" to assure on his own initiative the truthfulness and
completeness of Rule 33 answers can be obviated, at least up to the
date of the conference, by requiring at that time disclosure of rele-
vant information acquired after the original answers were served.6 1
The run-of-the-mill case should be presented to the pre-trial
judge shortly before trial with a workable pre-trial statement pre-
pared for the court, so that each of the items specified in Rule 16
can be fully and fairly placed before the court for resolution. The
technique and the procedures for conducting the conference varies
from court to court, but the rule itself dictates a procedure.6 2 Wise
use of discovery makes the pre-trial conference come into its proper
place and shortens the time, expense and complexity of every trial.
XI. CONCLUSION
The plaintiff's advantageous use of discovery will necessarily
lead to a fair evaluation of his case. With the proper discovery, sum-
mary judgment becomes an obtainable end to all or some of the
issues, and pre-trial is expedited. In short, the notice pleading con-
templated by the Federal Rules, when coupled with proper dis-
covery, assures a simplified trial and speedier justice.
61 Note, The Continuing Nature of Discovery Techniques, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 579 (1957).
62 See, Kincaid, A Judge's Handbook of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 F.R.D. 437 (1955); Rule 16, when
analyzed as a whole, seems to serve four general purposes:
1. To identify, designate, and clarify the true issues and eliminate apparent issues which present
no real controversy.
2. To facilitate proof, by means of stipulations regarding:
(a) Admissions of fact and genuineness of documents,
(b) Waiver of formal proof of documents and things,
(c) Physical or mental examination of the person,
(d) Inspection of books or property,
(e) Interrogotories and depositions,
(f) Limitation upon the number of witnesses,
(g) References to a master to make findings, and
(h) Other similar matters.
3. To offer a convenient opportunity for disposing of preliminary matters, such as dismissal,
change of venue to another division, judgment, consolidation of cases and separation of issues for
trial, fixing the date of trial, etc.
4. To encourage settlements.
Sunderland, Procedure for Pre-Trial Conferences in the Federal Courts, 28 J.Am.Jud.Soc'y. 46, 47
(1944). See also, Steyer, Discovery in Pre-Trial Conference Procedure, 23 F.R.D. 347 (1959).
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